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Abstract
Chemical terrorist attacks by non-state actors have traditionally been characterised as low
probability events; however, the apparent normalisation of chemical weapons use, including
by terrorists, in the ongoing conﬂict in Syria is causing some in the international security
community to question whether it will remain low probability. For Europe there is an
additional potential concern, namely the numbers of EU citizens who are “foreign ﬁghters”
and whose return from the conﬂict zone might also result in “importing” chemical weapons
use. This article examines the rise of the “chemical weapons-returning foreign ﬁghter”
narrative and considers aspects of the European response. These responses predate the
current concerns and include important efforts to create a robust public health response, such
as early alert and communication systems, so that the attractiveness of these weapons being
used within a European context might be reduced. Although there are limitations as to how
far one can transfer what happens in a Syrian context to Europe, the suggestion is made that
some of the framing assumptions within this response architecture may be now inadvertently
limiting the potential to identify and respond to chemical attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of March 2017, the International Committee of the Red Cross regional
director for the Middle East, Robert Mardini, issued the following statement:
“During the past two days, [West Erbil Emergency] hospital has admitted ﬁve children and
two women showing clinical symptoms consistent with an exposure to a blistering chemical
agent. The use of chemical weapons is absolutely prohibited under international
humanitarian law. We are deeply alarmed by what our colleagues have seen, and we
strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons, by any party, anywhere.”1
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1 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Iraq: ICRC strongly condemns use of chemical weapons around
Mosul” (3 March 2017), available at <www.icrc.org/en/document/iraq-icrc-strongly-condemns-use-chemical-
weapons-around-mosul> accessed 10 March 2017.
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This recent allegation of chemical weapons use in the ongoing conﬂict in Syria and
Iraq joins countless others that have been made since 2012. All sides stand accused,
regime forces as well as non-regime, including the terrorist group Da’esh (also known
as ISIS, ISIL, Islamic State). For a weapon that had been considered de-legitimised as
a currency of power, the allegations of repeated use, a number of which have been
conﬁrmed through United Nations investigation, have shocked. Indeed such is their
number that some observers caution that chemical weapons use may be becoming
normalised.2
Alongside many countries, representatives from European states have strongly
condemned these uses of chemical weapons. However it is the idea of non-state actors
using chemical weapons that appears to particularly exercise them. France, for example,
recently noted that “The danger of the use of chemical weapons is real. Non-State actors
no longer hesitate to use them”3 and Germany has gone further, suggesting that it should
be “no surprise to us that a barbaric group of merciless people such as the so-called ISIL
does not recognise any limits regarding the weaponry it uses.”4 Slovakia, on behalf of
the EU, has also spoken of how “gravely concerned” the EU is “about the risk of State
and non-State actors acquiring such weapons, which has already become a dark reality in
the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq.”5 In expressing these sentiments, Europe does not
stand alone. For example, Julie Bishop, Australia’s Foreign Minister, described what
is happening in Syria and Iraq as meaning that “long accepted paradigms” and
“conventional wisdom” regarding the “terrorist intention to acquire and weaponise
chemical agents has been largely aspirational” are “becoming obsolete”.6
Non-state actor use of chemical weapons has a particular salience to European states
because of another striking feature of the conﬂict, namely the number of European
nationals that have travelled to the region to join groups such as Da’esh. The outward
ﬂow of these citizens to the conﬂict zone poses obvious external security issues to
Europe, but their return may also pose problems for internal security and public health.
With Da’esh now found through UN investigation to have used chemical weapons, a
new variation on this internal security narrative has emerged, namely that returning
foreign ﬁghters may somehow “import” chemical weapons use to Europe.7
This article explores how this new chemical weapons variation of the returning foreign
ﬁghter narrative has emerged. In doing so the article details how activities to reduce
European vulnerabilities to chemical terrorist attack predate the current security concerns
about Syria and have evolved within a particular cognitive framing and conceptualisation
of what is and is not chemical terrorism.Whilst there are very real limitations as to how far
2 See, for example, R Guthrie, as quoted in E Graham-Harrison, “Chemical weapons attacks in Syria may normalise
war crimes, experts warn” The Guardian (11 August 2016).
3 France “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mr Philppe Lalliot Permanent Representative of France” Eighty-Second
Session of the Executive Council (OPCW, 2016).
4 Germany “Statement by HE Ambassador Christoph Israng Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of
Germany” Eighty-third Session of the Executive Council (OPCW, 2016).
5 Slovakia “Statement on behalf of the European Union delivered by H.E. Ambassador Roman Buzek permanent
representative of Slovakia to the OPCW” Eighty-third Session of the Executive Council (OPCW, 2016).
6 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, “Address to Australia Group Plenary”(5 June 2015), available at <http://
foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2015/jb_sp_150605.aspx>.
7 Europol, TE-SAT 2016, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016, 2016. doi:10.2813/525171.
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one can – and should – apply the sort of “terrorist activity transfer” narrative which is now
apparent, in this article I suggest that a cognitive bias in how we understand what
constitutes a chemical terrorist attack may be inadvertently limiting our ability to prepare
and respond to a chemical terrorist attack. In order to further reduce vulnerabilities to
chemical attacks, a re-examination of conceptualisations may be needed.
The article begins by detailing chemical weapons use in Syria and Iraq, placing a
particular emphasis on use by Da’esh and possible initial acquisition routes. The article
then proceeds to discuss how what is happening in Syria and Iraq links to what is being
portrayed as “the biggest security issue” currently facing Europe, namely the return of
the large numbers of Europeans who have participated in the conﬂict.8 The article then
turns to the multifaceted policy responses and notes their evolution from being framed
largely as an external issue to increasingly both an internal and external issue. This
evolution becomes more apparent in the discussion that follows, which details the
evolution of the chemical terrorism threat narrative. The article concludes with a
reﬂective discussion about how the framing assumptions imbued within our responses
may inadvertently limit our ability to respond and suggests the need for thinking again
about what chemical terrorism means in a European context.
II. SHIFTING NORMATIVE LANDSCAPES: CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
The ﬁrst allegations that chemical weapons (CW) were being used in Syria began to
emerge in 2012 and increased throughout 2013 until they reached a climax in late August
with the use of the nerve agent sarin in the Ghouta suburbs of Damascus.9 Since then,
and despite Syria becoming a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
and having its (declared) CW stockpiles removed, allegations that toxic chemicals are
being used as weapons of war have continued, seemingly unabated.10
Because the allegations continued after Syria had joined the CWC in September 2013, the
Director General of the international implementing organisation of that convention, the
Organisation for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (OPCW), decided to establish a Fact-
Finding Mission (FFM) to “establish facts surrounding” allegations of use.11 That decision
was driven in part because conﬁrmation that toxic chemicals were being used as weapons
would constitute a gross violation of the fundamental purpose of the Convention – to exclude
completely, for the sake of all mankind, the possibility of the use of chemical weapons.12
The FFMs did go on to establish that toxic chemicals had been used in some of the
allegations they investigated but their mandate did not extend to attribution. In other words
8 M Banks, “Returning foreign ﬁghters are biggest threat to EU, Parliament warned” The Parliament Magazine
(12 October 2016).
9 For attacks prior to Ghouta see, for example, J Perry Robinson, “Alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria” 2013, 4,
Harvard Sussex Program Occasional Paper, 13 June, available at <www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/occasional%
20papers/HSPOP_4.pdf> accessed 25 September 2017.
10 See, for example, A MacDonald and A Ullah, “Three years after Ghouta, chemical weapons used ‘over and over
again’ in Syria” Middle East Eye (22 August 2016).
11 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “OPCW to Undertake Fact-Finding Mission in Syria on
Alleged Chlorine Gas Attacks” (The Hague, 29 April 2014), available at <www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-to-
undertake-fact-ﬁnding-mission-in-syria-on-alleged-chlorine-gas-attacks/> accessed 27 September 2017.
12 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (adopted 13 January 1993, entered into force 29 April 1997) Preamble.
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the FFMs established use, but not by whom. That was/is the mandate of the Joint UN-OPCW
Investigation Mechanism (JIM)13 and in the course of their ﬁrst year of work the JIM found
“sufﬁcient evidence” to attribute agency in four out of nine cases they investigated. In three of
the cases, all involving chlorine barrel bombs, they determined that the Syrian Air Force was
responsible; in the fourth case they determined that Da’esh had used sulphur-mustard ﬁlled
artillery shells.14 In all cases, the health impacts were rapid and localised.
Two characteristics of these cases are worth noting. The ﬁrst is that they involved the use
of “crude” chemicals – chlorine and mustard agents – conveyed, in three cases, by equally
basic delivery systems, ie barrel bombs. Crude here is a reference to the agents not being the
so-called classical CW agents but instead toxic industrial chemicals. The idea that these
types of toxic chemicals rather than the more sophisticated CW agents might ﬁnd utility in
contemporary conﬂicts has been warned about for some time, with experts positing that
factors other than relative aggressivity, for example accessibility, availability and/or
terrorising potentiality, may now drive decisions about whether or not to use CW.15
The second aspect worth noting is that all sides in the conﬂict stand accused and have been
found wanting. Whilst it was the regime accusing their opponents of using toxic chemicals
that triggered the very ﬁrst set of investigations in the summer of 2013, accusations pertaining
to use by Da’esh began appearing in the open domain more frequently in late 2014/early
2015.16 Reports over those months appeared also to suggest an evolution in their capabilities
ﬁrst in delivery systems (from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices to mortar
attacks17) then in agents used (from chlorine to mustard agents18).
How Da’esh ﬁrst acquired its CW capability and the nature of its current CW
capability is not reported with certainty within open literature, though at least three
potential pathways are suggested. The ﬁrst two suggest that acquisition was based on
availability. One pathway stresses Iraq’s former CW programme and in particular the
looting of the Saddam Hussein era site at Muthanna. According to reports of a letter
written by the Iraqi UN ambassador, Mohamed Ali Alhakim, to the UN General
Secretary in July 2014 “the project manager (of Muthanna) spotted the looting of some
equipment via the camera surveillance system before the ‘terrorists’ disabled it”.19 The
same reports suggest that bunkers 13 and 41 were amongst those buildings looted.20
Both of these bunkers are known chemical munition storage bunkers, with the former
13 United Nations Security Council (7 August 2015) Resolution 2235.
14 The incidents investigated and attributed to the Syrian air force were at Talmenes in the Idlib governorate on
21 April 2014; and at Qmenas and Sarmin both in the Idlib governorate 16 March 2015. The attack attributed to Da’esh
was at Marea, Aleppo governorate on 21 August 2015. See OPCW/UN, “Third Report of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism” (2016).
15 See, for example, G Pearson, “The importance of implementation of the General Purpose Criterion of the Chemical
Weapons Convention” (2006) 55 Chemistry in Industry 413, 414 and J Perry Robinson, “Difﬁculties facing the
Chemical Weapons Convention” (2008) 84 International Affairs 226–227.
16 See Associated Press Iraq, “Islamic State used chemical weapons against peshmerga, Kurds say” The Guardian
(London, 14 March 2015).
17 G Winﬁeld, “Bitter as the cud” CBRNe World (18 October 2016), available at <www.cbrneworld.com/news/
bitter_as_the_cud#axzz4b3nxZIZ2> accessed 27 September 2017.
18 See A Entous, “Islamic State Suspected of Using Chemical Weapon, US Says” Wall Street Journal
(13 August 2015).
19 E Lederer, “Iraq: ‘Terrorists’ seize ex-chemical weapons site” Associated Press (9 July 2014), available at <http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/iraq-says-terrorists-seize-chemical-weapons-site>.
20 ibid.
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declared by the Iraqi’s as containing about 2,500 rockets ﬁlled with sarin before the
structure was damaged by aerial bombardment in 1991.21 Whilst this acquisition
pathway may appear sound, experts query it, including Zanders who contends that any
sarin that might have been found by Da’esh at al Muthanna was “highly likely [to] have
degraded below any useful degree of purity.”22
The second “availability” pathway suggests the Syrian regime as the source of Da’esh
capabilities. A recent Foreign Policy article detailing what it calls “the story of Abu
Ahmad, a Syrian operative for the Islamic State” dates acquisition to December 2012
when anti-regime groups, including Da’esh, overran a regime army base known as
Regiment 111 and took possession of “barrels ﬁlled with chlorine, sarin and mustard
gas.”23 The suggestion that the regime may be the source of Da’esh’s chemical weapons
was also stated in one of the rare occasions that a Da’esh ﬁghter publically justiﬁed their
use of chemical weapons.24
Both of these pathways suggest that Da’esh had/has no indigenous CW production
capability but rather that availability ﬁgured/ﬁgures highly in their decision-making
process. By contrast, the third pathway suggests Da’esh sought/seeks its own crude
production capability by deliberately recruiting former CW scientists and “highly
technically trained professionals, including from the West”.25 In the category of
former weapons scientists associated with Da’esh was Abu Malik, who was described as
working “at Saddam Hussein’s Muthana chemical weapon production facility
before afﬁliating with al Qaeda Iraq in 2005 and later joining Da’esh.” 26 His death in
2015 was expected to “temporarily degrade and disrupt…and diminish”Da’esh’s ability
to produce chemical weapons.27 So too was the capture of “Abu Dawud, ISIL’s emir
of chemical and traditional weapons manufacturing” in March 2016 – he was said to
have provided information about their CW production facilities and those involved in
the effort.28 Six months after his capture US forces announced that they had struck
what they called a pharmaceutical plant complex that been had converted into a CW
production site.29
21 United Nations Monitoring, Veriﬁcation and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Compendium of Iraq’s
Proscribed Weapons Programmes in the Chemical, Biological and Missile Areas (June 2007), Chapter III: Chemical
Weapons Programme, 292.
22 JP Zanders, “What’s he building in there?” (2014) August CBRNe World 8, 10.
23 H Doornbos and J Moussa, “How the Islamic State Seized a Chemical Weapons Stockpile” Foreign Policy
(17 August 2016), available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/17/how-the-islamic-state-seized-a-chemical-
weapons-stockpile/>.
24 H Johnson, “On Chemical Weapons and Red M&M’s, an Islamic State Fighter Defends the Cause” Foreign Policy
(1 September 2015), available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/01/on-chemical-weapons-and-red-mms-an-
islamic-state-ﬁghter-defends-the-cause/>.
25 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, supra, note 6.




28 US Department of Defense, “Press Brieﬁng by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook” (10 March 2016), available at
<www.inherentresolve.mil/News/Article/692164/department-of-defense-press-brieﬁng-by-pentagon-press-secretary-
peter-cook/>.
29 L Dearden, “ISIS chemical weapons manufacturing facility that posed ‘signiﬁcant threat’ destroyed by air strikes
in Iraq” The Independent (London, 14 September 2016).
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III. THE “BIGGEST SECURITY ISSUE” FACING EUROPE
It is the idea that Da’esh might be deliberately recruiting “highly trained professionals,
including from the West” that turns chemical weapons use taking place in Syria and Iraq
into a potential internal problem for Europe. Foreign ﬁghter30 mobilisation is neither new
in conﬂicts nor for the current proponents of “jihadi terrorism.”31 However, it is the sheer
numbers that have departed Europe for the region since 2013, recently estimated as
exceeding 5,800, that means the issue has both “internal” and “external” security
dimensions for Europe.32 This dual “internal/external” framing of the issue has been
present in documents and speeches since the beginning of the conﬂict. A report
published by the EU’s Counter Terrorism Co-ordinator in January 2011, for example,
notes that “a signiﬁcant number of radicalised people travel from the EU to conﬂict areas
or are attending terrorist training camps and then returning to Europe. They pose a clear
threat to internal security.”33 Over the course of six years the perception that this threat
has grown is such that returning foreign ﬁghters are now considered the “biggest security
issue” currently facing Europe.34
As primary actors in security matters, governments across much of Europe have
responded by enacting a range of measures in an effort to stem the outward ﬂow of
citizens. Travel to the conﬂict zone has been criminalised; new legislation related to
countering extremism has been introduced; prosecutorial powers have been enhanced,
as have the powers of the security services. In addition, counter radicalisation and
counter narrative programmes have been established.35 At the European level, a
spectrum of activities have been important in supporting EU Member States, not least
because of the similarity in the nature of the challenges and the scale of the phenomenon.
At one end of this spectrum are initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network
that links practitioners from around Europe who work daily with people who have
already been radicalised or who are vulnerable to radicalisation. In addition, the network
30 Despite the phrase having currency in the media and policy-making circles, there is no agreed (legal or academic)
deﬁnition of “foreign ﬁghter.” Within the academic literature a range of deﬁnitions are found. Some are broad based
deﬁnitions, such as Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty’s deﬁnition as “non-indigenous, non-territorialized combatants
who, motivated by religion, kinship, and/or ideology rather than pecuniary reward, enter a conﬂict zone to participate
in hostilities” and Ian Bryan’s description of them as being “not agents of foreign governments, but they leave home
typically to ﬁght for a transnational cause or identity.” Others are more restrictive, such as Thomas Hegghammer’s
deﬁnition that a “foreign ﬁghter [is] an agent who (1) has joined, and operates within the conﬁnes of, an insurgency,
(2) lacks citizenship of the conﬂict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks afﬁliation to an ofﬁcial military
organization, and (4) is unpaid.” See C Moore and P Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical
Assessment” (2008) 31 Studies in Conﬂict and Terrorism 412; I Bryon, “Sovereignty and the Foreign Fighter Problem”
(2010) 54 Orbis 115; T Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad”
(2010–11) 45 International Security 54.
31 For more see Hegghammer, supra, note 30, 53–54; M Flores, “Foreign ﬁghter involvement in national and
international wars” in A de Guttry, F Capone and C Paulussen (eds), Foreign Fighters under International Law and
Beyond (The Hague, Asser Press, 2016); J Rehman, Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from
Terrorism (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005).
32 Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “European Jihadi Watch” 3 March 2017, available at <http://cat-int.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/03/European-jihad-watch-20170306_eng-1.pdf>.
33 EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator, “EU Action Plan on combatting terrorism” 15893/1/10 REV 1
(17 January 2011).
34 Banks, supra, note 8.
35 For an overview of Member States’ actions in this area see <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/
networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-and-member-states/repository>.
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provides a platform for peer support and sharing of best practices and the associated
Centre of Excellence also supports the Commission and Member States in their work.36
At the other end of the spectrum, efforts have concentrated on, amongst other things, the
strengthening the external borders including by negotiating a revision to the Schengen
Borders Code.37
The spectrum approach at both the European and Member State level appears to have
been successful in slowing the rate of those travelling from Europe to the conﬂict zone.
One European state, for example, reported to the UN Sanctions and Monitoring Team in
January 2017 that “while some [of its citizens] were still attempting to travel to the
conﬂict zone, the ﬂow was much reduced, down from up to 100 individuals per month in
2013 and 2014 to fewer than 5 per month in 2016.”38
Increasingly however, the focus of policy concern has turned to address those that may
return. In part this is linked to recent territorial losses experienced by Da’esh and the
expected fall of Raqqa. Some European ofﬁcials believe this will lead to large numbers
of citizens returning to Europe, including larger numbers of those who will return with
the express intention of bringing the conﬂict to Europe.39
Whilst it is acknowledged that “returning” is done for a variety of reasons, including
disillusionment, it is those who might return to Europe still committed to Da’esh and the
conﬂict that particularly worries ofﬁcials.40 Statistical analysis suggests that only a small
percentage who return will fall into this category, however there is a concern that this
may change as higher numbers return to Europe.41 The “authority” to attack Europe has
been given by leaders such as Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the former Da’esh
spokesperson, who advocated amongst other things the use of poison on “the
disbelieving American, Frenchmen or any of their allies” and Al Qaeda’s leader
Ayman al-Zawahiri.42 Worryingly, the work of Thomas Hegghammer suggests that if
terrorist attacks involve returnees then they are more likely to be successful and result in
higher casualties.43 Proponents of this view point to the involvement of returnees in
incidents such as the Brussels Jewish Museum attack in May 2014; the January 2015
attacks on the headquarters of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, and the subsequent
36 See <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en>.
37 European Council Press, “Schengen borders code: Council adopts regulation to reinforce checks at external
borders” (7 March 2017), available at <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07-regulation-
reinforce-checks-external-borders/>.
38 UN 2017, p 7.
39 P Wintour, “Islamic State ﬁghters returning to UK ‘pose huge challenge’” The Guardian (London, 9 March 2017).
40 A connected concern regards foreign ﬁghters using social media to inspire attacks in their former home countries.
The French Da’esh member Rachid Kassim, for example, is said to be behind several plots in France and has been vocal
on social media calling for attacks in European countries and attacks on individuals such as religious leaders and
politicians. See A Amarasingam, “An Interview with Rachid Kassim, Jihadist Orchestrating Attacks in France” 2016
Jihadology (November).
41 T Hegghammer and P Nesser, “Assessing Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking the West” (2015) 9
Perspectives on Terrorism 14, 20.
42 AM Al Adnani, In the Name of Allah the Beneﬁcent the Merciful Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful (9 September
2014), available at <https://quotecatalog.com/communicator/abu-muhammad-al-adnani/> and Reuters “Al Qaeda chief
urges lone wolf attacks, militant unity” (13 September 2015), available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
zawahri-idUSKCN0RD0E920150913>.
43 T Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between
Domestic and Foreign Fighting” (2013) 107 American Political Science Review 1, 10.
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attack on a kosher supermarket in Paris; the November 2015 Paris attacks and the
Brussels airport and metro attacks in March 2016. However, conducting attacks using
guns and improvised explosive devices in Europe is not the same as conducting attacks
with toxic chemicals.
IV. THE EVOLVING THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY
Current policy responses to the perceived foreign ﬁghter threat to European internal
security can be traced to the 2005 European Union Strategy for Combating
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism,44 which itself was a reaction to the 2004
Madrid and 2005 London bombings. This strategy was typical of the relatively general,
and indeed externally facing, approach that was taken to address the issue of foreign
ﬁghters before the European Council charged that “the creation of an Islamic Caliphate
in Iraq and Syria and the Islamist-extremist export of terrorism on which it is based, is a
direct threat to the security of the European countries.” 45
As the issue took on a more internal security dimension, additional effort has ensued to
encourage the accelerated implementation of a package of measures to support Member
States in such ways as enhancing the ability to share information, deepening cooperation
between security services and enhancing the criminal justice response. Institutional
expansion has also occurred, including through the establishment of the European
Counter Terrorism Centre in January 2016, which is described as:
“a platform through which Member States can increase information sharing and operational
cooperation with regard to: the monitoring and investigation of foreign terrorist ﬁghters; the
trafﬁcking of illegal ﬁrearms; and terrorist ﬁnancing and the identiﬁcation of additional
lines of investigations.”46
This description implies a work focus on “conventional” forms of terrorism rather than
those involving toxic chemicals. This is understandable, given the rarity of deliberate
chemical incidents compared to the unfortunately more frequent conventional attacks.
However, in a recent report, the Counter Terrorism Co-ordinator noted that not all
Member States are taking advantage of the institutional arrangement and opportunity to
share information. Indeed, he described the levels of information sharing as not sufﬁcient
and not reﬂecting the threat.47
In much the same way that the foreign ﬁghter issue was portrayed as largely an
external security issue before the caliphate was declared, the EU and Member States
tended to frame CW use in Syria and Iraq as an external threat until Da’esh began to
be directly accused of using them. Until this, much of the European action was focused
on reducing the external threat. In their 2013 Towards a Comprehensive Approach
document, for example, the Council framed chemical and biological threats as follows:
44 European Council (24 November 2005), “European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment
to Terrorism” 14781/1/05.
45 European Council, Special Meeting of the European Council, 30 August 2014, p 6.
46 See EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (4 March 2016), “State of play on implementation of the statement of the
Members of the European Council of 12 February 2015, the JHA Council Conclusions of 20 November 2015, and the
Conclusions of the European Council of 18 December 2015” 6785/16.
47 ibid.
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“There are mounting concerns over reports of the use of chemical and biological weapons
in Syria. The EU will continue calling for UN inspectors to be allowed into the country to
investigate all such allegations. In order to prevent, detect and respond to such devastating
events with potentially deadly consequences for the population in the region, the EU is
currently examining possible options for further coordination and cooperation that could be
explored with EU Member States, relevant international bodies (OCHA, ICRC, WHO,
INTERPOL and OPCW) and strategic partners….
The EU will continue to urge Syria to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to
ratify the Biological Weapons Convention as a matter of urgency. The EU recalls that any
use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and
completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community. The
Syrian authorities bear a particular responsibility to ensure that their chemical weapons are
stored securely pending independently veriﬁed destruction and are not permitted to fall into
the hands of any other State or non-state actor.”48
The EU and Member States engaged vigorously in such efforts, including taking leading
roles in the international effort to remove and destroy the declared stockpiles of chemical
weapons from Syria.
By May 2014 the framing appears to have evolved to take on more internal
considerations, as shown by the explicit mentions that Da’esh may seek to use chemical
weapons in Europe appearing in documents such as Commission Communication to the
European Parliament, Council, Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions.49 This communication noted that “even though terrorists have tended to use
commercial or homemade explosives, CBRN agents such as sarin, ricin or anthrax also
represent a serious threat”.50 No elaboration is given, which is as one might expect in a
public document of this type, but interestingly the connection to the issue of returning
foreign ﬁghters is made immediately:
“Latest reports suggest that of particular concern are returnees from Syria. Some of these
and other radicalised individuals, having access to and working in sensitive areas might use
their insider knowledge to strike against critical infrastructures, such as a water puriﬁcation
plant, or they may disable railways electrical power supplies. Such insider threats may have
transnational impacts and therefore also pose threats to EU security.” (emphasis added)51
The reframing of the threat as an internal issue resulted in the Commission urging
that “a robust, better designed, and proportionate strategy to anticipate and deter”
future chemical (biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosive) risks at EU
level was needed. This was to include new or strengthened actions to tackle illegal
methods of production, handling, concealing and storing of agents.52 Whilst
perhaps only close EU observers may have been alert to this shifting narrative, certain
media outlets, especially in the UK, began reporting that Da’esh would attack Europe
48 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of The Regions Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to the Syrian Crisis
(24 June 2013).
49 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a new EU approach to the detection
and mitigation of CBRN-E risks (5 May 2014).
50 ibid pp 2–3; CBRN stands for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear.
51 ibid.
52 ibid 3.
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using chemical weapons.53 This idea received more widespread attention following
the warning given by the then French Prime Minister to his Parliament that that
Da’esh may use chemical and biological weapons in Europe.54 This warning was
made in the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks and in the
apparent knowledge that an attempt to contaminate water supplies around Paris had just
been foiled.55
The attacks in Paris provided fertile ground for more open consideration in policy
documents that Da’esh might employ non-conventional tactics in Europe, including
through using chemical weapons. A December 2015 European Parliamentary Brieﬁng
Note, for example, argued that because Da’esh had “vowed that future strikes will be
more lethal and even more shocking” than Paris,
“The European Union and its Member States must prepare for the possibility of a chemical
or biological attack on their territory by the self-styled ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(known variously as IS, ISIS or ISIL, and by the Arabic acronym ‘Da’esh’)”.56
The authors recommended alert and that “European governments and EU institutions…
should consider publicly addressing the possibility of a terrorist attack using chemical,
biological, radiological or even nuclear materials.”57
Supporting the report’s framing and recommendations was the work of “several
experts”, quoted in the paper as having previously written that “there is a genuine risk of
ISIL/Da’esh using chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear materials in the
context of future attacks on European targets” and that “an improvised explosive device
containing chemical or radioactive materials” was a possible next weapon of choice for
them.58 One of the experts quoted in the Brieﬁng Note was Nomi Bar-Yaacov, who had
previously written:
“What makes ISIS so dangerous is its radical ideology coupled with its continued success in
recruiting hundreds of foreign ﬁghters, including some with degrees in physics, chemistry,
and computer science, and some who have previously worked in Saddam Hussein’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme.”59
The implication here and in reports such as Europol’s 2016 European Union Terrorism
Situation and Trend Report,60 which says “The phenomenon of individuals travelling for
terrorist purposes to conﬂict zones increases the risk that expertise in the use of chemical
weapons can be transferred to the European Union by returning foreign terrorist
ﬁghters…”, is that what is happening in the Syrian and latterly Iraqi context can be easily
53 See, for example, M Robinson, “Hundreds of British jihadis trained to launch ‘highly likely’ chlorine gas attack on
train, tube or football match in UK warns top chemical warfare expert” The Daily Mail (London, 23 March 2015);
D Haynes and F Hamilton, “Rising fears of chemical attack by UK Jihadists; Isis terrorists turn to bombs laced with
chlorine; Rennie: Carmichael must stay” The Times (London, 25 May 2015).
54 A search of the European newspapers on the Nexis database using the search terms “chemical weapons” and “Valls”
returns 72 hits in the two days after the Prime Minister, Monsieur Valls, made his statement.
55 Europol, supra, note 7, 14.
56 European Parliament Brieﬁng, “ISIL/Da’esh and ‘non-conventional’ weapons of terror” (December 2015).
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 N Bar-Yaacov, “What if Isis launches a chemical attack in Europe?” The Guardian (London, 27 November 2015).
60 Europol, supra, note 7.
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imported to Europe. This is highly questionable for a number of reasons, including, as
Burton noted:
“Just as ﬁghting an insurgency is different from ﬁghting a pitched battle or conventional
war, it also different from conducting clandestine operations in a hostile environment, far
from your base of support.”61
Burton goes on to say that whilst this does not make an attack using something that had
proved successful in another context impossible, it does make it much more challenging,
requiring additional obstacles to be overcome. When reﬂecting on chemical terrorism
being imported to Europe the same reasoning also applies: whilst an attack is not
impossible, simply put Europe is not Syria or Iraq. Ensuring that Europe is/remains an
“inhospitable environment” to such forms of terrorism is therefore essential.62
V. COUNTERING THE “NEW” CHEMICAL TERRORISM THREAT
As stated above, the competence to respond to the now increasingly intertwined potential
threat from foreign ﬁghters and chemical terrorism lies with the Member States.
However, because both issues have potential cross-border implications, there has been
much European activity and again much of it predates the current security situation.
Some of this activity falls under the general anti-terrorism umbrella or slightly more
speciﬁc CBRN umbrella. Thus, for example, we can refer to chemical terrorism being
included in EC deﬁnitions of terrorism since the 2002 Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism. As with this decision document, much of the current activity is in
reaction to past terrorist events. As the European Commissioner for Security, Julian
King, recently stated, the EU needs “to learn from each attack so that we are able to turn
yesterday’s terrorist successes into tomorrow’s terrorist failures.” 63 Whilst this is true,
what happens when past use is rare?
Within the European context, the idea that a chemical terrorism attack might occur has
traditionally been characterised as a low probability event. As with other low probability
threats, bespoke systems or policies tend not to be created and instead are added onto, or
merged into, related efforts. Such is the case with responding to chemical terrorism,
where a wide set of policies enacted for other reasons can be viewed as pertinent to
reducing potential vulnerabilities that might be exploited by terrorists. These include
policies and schemes related to the transport of dangerous goods, improvements to the
physical security and safety of sites that contain large quantities of dangerous substances,
setting storage threshold quantities at such facilities and the classiﬁcation, packaging and
labelling of chemical substances and mixtures.
Perhaps most central to creating and/or maintaining an inhospitable environment for
chemical terrorism is possessing a robust public health response. This is recognised by
the EU, and much effort has been spent developing a European health security
framework. This framework is based around the three pillars of prevention, preparedness
61 F Burton, in M Kenney, Organization Learning and Islamic Militancy Project report number 226808 (US
Department of Justice, 2009) 117.
62 See G Ackerman in MM Hafez and M Rasmussen, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect:
Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators. Workshop Report” 2010.
63 J King, “Keynote address at Security and Defence Conference 2017” Chatham House, London, 6 March 2017.
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and response. Within the response pillar, the ability to circulate specialist information
in a most timely fashion to relevant actors, including those in public health, is essential
and various early alerting and communication systems for incidents that may/will have
cross-border implications have been set up.
In the chemical area such are the potential routes of contamination that a number of
these alert systems, none of which were created speciﬁcally for deliberate releases of
chemicals, are relevant. These include the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed
(RASFF); the Industrial Accident Notiﬁcation System (IAN); the Major Accident
Reporting System (eMARS); and the early warning system associated with the European
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (REITOX).
To reconcile the need for multiple event reporting, the 2013 European Parliament
Decision on Serious Cross-Border Threats to Health decision linked these and all other
reporting platforms with one overarching system, the Early Warning and Response
System (EWRS).64 Incidents are input into the EWRS if the event satisﬁes the following
conditions:
∙ it is unusual or unexpected for the given place and time, or it causes or may cause
signiﬁcant morbidity or mortality in humans, or it grows rapidly or may grow
rapidly in scale, or it exceeds or may exceed national response capacity; and
∙ it affects or may affect more than one Member State; and
∙ it requires or may require co-ordinated response at the Union level.
However, not all chemical incidents, deliberate or otherwise, would satisfy this criteria.
But if they should, the EWRS platform uses a free text data entry system so as to allow
the person inputting to be comprehensive in passing on information relating to source:
type of risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread, etc.65 This
places an onus on communication skills.
By contrast, the more specialised alert system, RASCHEM, which sits below the
EWRS, uses a “non free text” data entry system to record and exchange information
about chemical incidents. Orford and colleagues consider this communication method to
be preferable, as it allows information exchange more readily across the multiple
European languages. Restricting free text, however, raises questions as to what
assumptions are embedded within the standardised terms.66
Neither the EWRS nor RASCHEM systems are designed speciﬁcally for use
in circumstances involving terrorism. This is the remit of a yet more focused
alert system, RAS-BICHAT, which focuses only on the exchange of information on
health threats due to deliberate release of chemical, biological and radio-nuclear
agents by terrorists. This alert system became operational in 2002 and “hooks up with”
EWRS, thus forming an important component of the European early alert and response
64 Commission Decision (2000/57/EC), “Commission Decision (2000/57/EC) of 22 December 1999 on the Early
Warning and Response System for the Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases under Decision No 2119/98/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council” (OJ L 21, 26-1-2000, p 32).
65 R Orford et al, “EU alerting and reporting systems for potential chemical public health threats and hazards” (2014)
72 Environment International 15, 17.
66 ibid 19.
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architecture.67 Notiﬁcations are made when a Member State suspects danger,
when an incident might be of cross-border character and where a co-ordinated
response might be needed, with the Commission acting as moderator, disseminating
the notiﬁcations once they have been validated. For obvious reasons, the reaction
to a notiﬁcation being issued on this system is extremely rapid. Kjellén describes the
process as follows:
“When a member state has posted an alert … it generates a text message to all ofﬁcers
concerned at DG Health and Consumers. Member states must additionally phone the
Commission’s Security Ofﬁce, which then contacts the ofﬁcer on duty. To begin with, only
that ofﬁcer needs to act on the warning [presenting] him/herself at the ofﬁce within one
hour… Once onsite the on-duty ofﬁcer examines the alert and veriﬁes that it has been sent
from an authorised source, whereupon a phone call is placed to the issuing member state to
ensure that the message is correct and that no important information is missing…After this
procedure, the warning is disseminated through RAS BICHAT to all member states’ points
of contact and to the Health Security Committee which must be convened in the case of an
emergency… designated points of contact must visit the protected RAS BICHAT website
to obtain full information on the incident. The member state must respond within an hour,
and should a member state neglect to do this, the Commission will telephone the country in
question for a follow-up ….”68
Should there be a serious crisis, the Commission’s Health Emergency Operation Facility
is used, which consists of both a crisis and communication centre. So as to ensure a high
degree of coordination between different policies potentially affected in a CBRN
incident with cross border potential (eg health and internal security, environment,
agriculture, customs, civil protection), internal crisis coordination arrangements have
been established. Known as ARGUS, the arrangement is designed to ensure rapid
decision making and information sharing among all involved services and the various
rapid alert systems mentioned above.69
VI. AN OPPORTUNISTIC MOMENT FOR EVALUATION
As can be seen, much effort has been expended prior to the current security situation
towards reducing European vulnerabilities to chemical terrorism and ensuring that
Europe is an inhospitable environment for this particular terrorist option. These efforts
form part of the architecture that works to ensure that what appears possible for Da’esh to
do in the Syrian and Iraqi environment is not directly nor easily transferable to the
Europe context. Nevertheless such dedicated efforts do not mean that all vulnerabilities
have been removed. For this reason, continuous effort is needed to reduce vulnerabilities
and ensure responses are attuned to scenarios which are sensitive to the European
context.
67 Netherlands, “Tasks and role of the European Commission in outbreak investigation, communicable disease
surveillance and Health Security”, Meeting of Experts to the Biological Weapons Convention, 21 July 2004.
68 SZ Kjellén, “Rapid alerts for crisis at the EU level” in Stefan Olson (ed), Crisis Management in the European
Union: Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies (Springer Science & Business Media, 2009) 67–68. At the time of
writing it has not been possible to ascertain whether this system uses a free text or non free text data entry system.
69 For an overview, see Belgium “European Union capacities to respond to CBRN attacks and CBRN incidents”,
Meeting of Experts to the Biological Weapons Convention, 12 August 2010.
655Recasting the Threat of Chemical Terrorism in the EU2017
Open source datasets record a small number of incidents involving toxic chemicals as
having occurred in Europe between 2002 and 2014.70 As such, Europol’s assessment
that “CBRN materials and their precursors are under strict control of governments,
keeping the threat at a minimal level”may be an appropriate assessment for traditionally
conceived CW agents, but it does not sit as easily if the conceptualisation of a chemical
attack is broadened.71 Indeed such an assessment may be seen as potential breeding
ground for complacency.
Consideration of Da’esh’s record in Syria and Iraq suggests availability as being an
important criteria in their decision-making process. This criteria would seem like a good
starting point for evaluation of the current mechanisms. As such, the recording in the
same Europol report of two French chemical facilities being attacked in 2015 may need
to be looked at again.72 There is past precedent for the deliberate targeting of chemical
facilities so as to exploit the secondary effects of the toxic chemicals being released.73
Within the current Europol framing, these attacks are presumably not recognised as acts
of chemical terrorism. In addition, details of that past precedent suggests they may not
fulﬁl the cross-border criteria and so the above alert systems may not be activated.
From a legal and policy perspective this may seem a moot point to raise. If a chemical
facility was attacked then appropriate action would be taken, but from a public health
response perspective the ability to recognise a terrorist incident as being a chemical
terrorist incident and circulating the right information to the right people in a timely
fashion is essential. Health impacts following CW attacks are very likely to be rapid
onset and so early and correct identiﬁcation will be essential in reducing its potential
health impact.
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Primary responsibility for security issues such as terrorism lies with Member States, and
so emphasis at the European level has been to facilitate the sharing of information and to
establish robust crisis management tools that would support Member States should a
crisis with cross-border implications occur. Within the public health response domain,
early alerting and communication systems play an important role in lessening the
potential impact of deliberate chemical attacks. As has been shown, several exist which
are pertinent and alongside a spectrum of other policy measures form an impressive
architecture that aims to make Europe an inhospitable environment for chemical weapon
attacks.
Many of the policy responses that deal with the potential threat posed by returning
foreign ﬁghters and chemical terrorism were devised in reaction to past terrorist events.
The 2004 and 2005 terrorist bombings in Madrid and London, as well as the more recent
Paris attacks, appear to have been particularly important inﬂuencers in the current
70 As recorded in the Global Terrorism Database, <www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>. A note of methodological caution:
amongst other things, these datasets will be incomplete both in terms of including only those instances which are in the
open domain and in terms of reporting only those incidents which have either been successful or successfully foiled.
71 Europol, supra, note 7, pp 14 and 16.
72 ibid pp 13–14.
73 During the Bosnian conﬂict, for example, Serbian forces deliberately attacked chemical plants near Kutina, Jovan
and Sisak over a two-year period so that environmental damage might be caused.
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anti-terrorism architecture. None of these were chemical terrorism incidents, but they can
be linked to chemical weapons if the collective term CBRN-E is used. Indeed it has been
noted above that early European Commission documents suggesting the potential
internal security threat posed by chemical weapons and returning foreign ﬁghters did,
through reference to CBRN-E terrorist incidents.74
Despite being a frequently used collective term, CBRN-E is problematic for a number
of reasons. This includes the way the term masks distinct technical and practical
differences between the ﬁve weapons types. Indeed, by using the collective term yet
referring mainly to E terrorist incidents – that is those involving explosives – an
impression is given that the risk of chemical terrorism attacks and the risk from attacks
using improvised explosive devices are equal. So too does linking uncritically the use of
chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq with potential future use in Europe.
Coupling a rare event with one that is relatively more frequent can be “useful” in
pushing the former towards the front burners of policymaking and stimulating policy
action like, for example, ensuring that existing public health early warning systems also
cover CW agents. However this same tactic can be misused. By hyping the rarer event
and appearing to give it increased prevalence or reporting it as an inevitable certainty75
inappropriate and/or draconian knee-jerk policy responses may be fashioned. Equally as
problematic is that it may also lead to “security theatre”, where measures are put in place
that give the perception of reducing vulnerabilities without actually doing so.76
In the case of the potential risk of returning foreign ﬁghters importing chemical
weapons use to Europe this has not yet happened. However, many of the public health
early warning systems covering chemical warfare agents have been created for purposes
other than terrorism. This suggests that there will be a number of embedded assumptions
which have now been transposed to chemical terrorism response. If indeed this is the
“biggest security issue” facing Europe, making these assumptions explicit and
examining them, especially within the early alert systems, would seem a prudent
action to take if potential vulnerabilities to chemical terrorism are to be reduced. The
present security concerns regarding returning foreign ﬁghters may therefore provide an
opportune window to think again about chemical terrorism and whether, within a
European context, our conceptualisation of what such a terrorist incident might look like
is appropriate.
74 See European Commission, supra, note 49.
75 Supra, note 53.
76 See B Schneier, “Beyond security theater” (2009) 427 New Internationalist 10.
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